




Understanding the options in
strategic decisions and
investments
If a company wants to move forward. it is usually faced with a
number of real options to choose from. RICHARD STEWARTj
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Should the plant be upgradednow, or should a competitor'sstrategy be replicated? Howmuch should be spent on
research and development (R&D) this
year and next? These are difficult
strategic questions for management,
requiring careful analysis, This paper
examines some of the developments in
real options analysis and argues that,
applied pragmatically, this approach
can capture benefits that traditional
valuation techniques cannot.
There is much debate about real
options analysis. Usually this debate
centres on the complexity of real
options and their modelling. There is
a popular misconception that real
options analysis is purely an academic
concept and too analytical to be
applied to management decision
making, and beyond the
comprehension of most boardrooms.
This is incorrect in our view. Real
options are embedded in investment
decisions managers make every day.
This paper argues that using a degree
of simple real options thinking in
addition to net present value
I:"PV)/discounted cashflow iDCF) can
yield a much better answer than that
of NPV/DCF alone. Real options
analysis is the tool of choice for those
seeking better answers to tough
strategic investment questions.
The challenge of strategic
investment decisions
Strategic investments such as those in
R&D create a number of important
challenges for firms. There is the
challenge of investment valuation - the
uncertainty of activities and associated
costs; the uncertainty of R&D output
and measurement; and the uncertainty
over exogenous events intervening to
unsettle assumptions (the surprise
management didn't see coming).
More than Black-Scholes theory
Real options are quite different from
financial options, and should not be
confused as a mere extension of
Black-Scholes options pricing. Unlike
financial options, real options do not
have any fixed variables such as strike
price and expiry periods. In addition,
several fundamentals that allow
financial options to be systematically
traded on exchanges, like liquid
markets for underlying assets, do not
hold true for real options.
Real options are rights, without
obligations, embedded in investment
projects (especially strategic ones like
R&D or market entry), to make
decisions. These may be contingent on
certain states of nature occurring that
enable management to reduce the risks
of the investments and add value
(Brealey and Myers 1996, McAneney
and Berkman 2000). The states of
nature that give real options value are
competitor responses or lessons from
success or failure. Essentially, the value
of real options lies in the flexibility
they provide.
-------
The value of flexibility
Real options thinking provides a set of
tools to help management understand
that flexibility is economically valuable.
Why? Because investments are
characterised by a degree of
uncertainty. While uncertainty can
only be resolved with time, flexibility
provides management with the right
but not the obligation to choose from
a pre-established set of actions so as to
limit downside risk and take advantage
of upside risk. For example, if a
development project meets with early
success, management can decide to
;-vest further or faster.
..:.mbedded options, whether through
design or otherwise, allow management
to be actively involved in the process
depending on the information feedback
that arises within the investment
period. One of the key strengths of
real options thinking is the descriptive
framework it provides to support the
strategic management of investments.
It values the strategy, but more
importantly, provides a map to
navigate future strategic decisions
which could impact value.
Previous research has tended to
consider this framework on three levels
- conceptual, analytical and empirical.
Conceptually, real options thinking
describes four generic options:
H Option to defer (wait for more
information before making a
decision). Management may decide
to lease a property or asset rather
than buy it, or decide to develop an
asset in stages without losing the
opportunity to undertake the full
investment. This enables the owner
of the option either to wait for more
information, or to shift the timing
of the decision to an optimal point
in time.
(b) Option to switch (right to change
tack). The option to switch applies
to investments already held by the
firm. This is a right, but not an
obligation, to repurpose assets to
alternative uses. This increases the
value of the investment as it
provides an insurance against a
total loss of value if the original
purpose of the investment becomes
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uneconomic. The inherent
flexibility of an employee in the
labour market is an example of such
an option.
(C) Option to expand (invest further in
a project or acquire). The option to
expand is a call option where an
investment permits present capacity
to be increased, if market conditions
improve. Examples are R&D joint
ventures or strategic acquisitions.
Typically, there exists an
opportunity to stage an R&D project
after the results from a pilot become
known at a future date. Hence the
pilot project itself may have a
negative NPV, however, the positive
NPV implications for subsequent
projects can only be discovered
when the pilot project is completed.
(d) Option to abandon (shut down or
scale back activity). The option to
abandon or scale back is similar to a
put option. The ability to put
capacity is important where output
prices may vary. These options have
been highlighted by recent activity
in the airline industry where planes
have been mothballed or returned
under lease agreements.
At the analytical level there have been
attempts since the mid-1980s to model
investment projects as complex options
to take account of different kinds of
uncertainty that arise in investment
projects such as mines, oil leases and;
pharmaceutical product development.
Trigeorgis (1996, p 225) makes the
point that analytical models are
somewhat limited in practice where
complex investment problems have
many real options operating that
interact simultaneously or when
competitive entry occurs leading to
compounding within or between
projects. Nevertheless work continues
in modelling these challenges (see
Trigeorgis 1996, chapter 7).
Empirical applications of real options
thinking are disproportionately low.
A recent survey by Brabazon (1999)
investigated the use of real options
thinking by US firms to evaluate
investments. He found that 9.8% of
firms interviewed were actively using
real options methodology to evaluate
investments. Moreover he found that
24.6% of the firms were expecting to be
using real options techniques within 3
years time. Australian companies
however, are more than 50% less likely
to use real options thinking than their
advanced American counterparts. In a
recent Australian survey, Matolcsy et al.
(2001) show that the incidence of use
of real options thinking in strategic
investment evaluations is less than 5%.
An extension of DCF - is it?
The capacity of real options thinking to
explain the value of flexibility has
broadened the set of assumptions that
is otherwise required under a simple
DCF framework. It amounts to a more
sophisticated version of a DCF analysis.
Not so far from DCF
Under a DCF analysis, the estimation of
the future income from projects is
subject to a discount rate that is
measured by the level of estimated risk.
NPV is based on the premise that
discounted projected outlays and
income within the time period of the
investment provide the summary
measure to determine whether
management should proceed with the
development or not. A positive net
present value supports a decision to
proceed while a negative one does not.
While much of the literature on real
options is motivated by the limitations
of present value analysis (Trigeorgis
1996), it fails to point out that DCF is
still a core element of real option
analysis. For this reason boardrooms
familiar with DCF should not fear real
options analysis, and those who have
used it once are often surprised by how
intuitive the process is.
Real options thinking examines the
contingency aspect of an investment as
separate from the valuation of the main
investment. It also entertains situations
where the decision to invest can be
made at any point within a <
predetermined future period as opposed ~
to a present irreversible decision.
Most importantly, however, it
provides management with a decision
framework by which they can consider
the optimal time to invest rather than




The fact that management has a
right, but not the obligation, to make a
decision (ie: exercise their option to
choose different paths) is an important
value driver that is easily overlooked in
terms of competitive advantage.
Most. experts agree tnat real
options have a part to ptav
In 1998, Copeland and Keenan
provided an overview of real options
and their value in capital investment
decisions. They argued that the passive
management assumptions implicit in
NPV modelling could generate counter
intuitive implications that could be
rectified by the application of real
options thinking. In particular they
argued that real options are powerful
where the investment contains a higher
level of flexibility without significant
opportunity loss due to the presence of
competition. For example, flexibility to
en tel' and exit a market, particularly
where the barriers to either are high, is
very valuable. Real options thinking is
highly applicable to more uncertain
investments where the investment
provides some competitive advantage.
ln 2000, Anderson provided a more
explicit link between strategy and real
options. He noted an increase of
emphasis in strategy theory that
combined a top-down with a bottom-
up strategy.
Bottom-up strategy refers to inter-
rm opportunities that management
needs to nurture to exploit internal
opportunities while keeping a top
down strategic direction. Anderson
also cites Lippman and Rumelt (1982)
who propose that whereas risk is
traditionally seen as negative, the
presence of risk for investment. and
the possibility that a firm mav create a
risk advantage over competitors by
employing real options thinking, turns
risk into an opportunity. If this sounds
strangely familiar, it is.
It is widely accepted that DCI' using
the capital asset pricing model (CAPIy!)
has limitations in capturing risk. In
; 1999, Chatterjee et al. used real options
thinking within a wider framework to
_ present an alternative interpretation
r: of management interaction with cost
~ of capital.
C..l,P\CIhas been consistently
challenged with the most notable
evidence provided by Farna and French
in their controversial 1992 study. They
observe the limited explanatory power
of beta to explain risk by itself and add
other firm characteristics that increase
the prediction accuracy of beta, such
as tactical risk and its management.
Tactical real options are procured
either through investments, or are
nurtured within the company through
knowledge management and
innovation.
The study of entrepreneurs provides
some interesting parallels. In 1999,
\clcGrath used real options to show
that failure can become a productive
feedback event rather than a negative
incentive for investment. She noted
that successful entrepreneurs employed
a portfolio approach with an emphasis
on overall return rather than individual
successes. Their skill was in limiting
downside risk through greater use of
expansion and abandonment options.
The benefits from this approach are
not onlv that a broader opportunity set
becomes available but entrepreneurs
actuallv gain from investments with
higher variance. This is an interesting
look at real options theory at work.
Real options analysis - Ilow
is it done?
The selected examples above
demonstrate the applicability of real
options thinking to strategic issues
such as risk minimisation, leverage and
optimal timing. Choice forms a
substantial part of the investment
decision. This all seems good in theory,
however converting this conceptual
thinking into measurable parameters
for investment evaluation and
performance evaluation depends upon
building analytical models that capture
these concepts. This is the current
challenge.
Start with traditional DCFas a
building block
A good place to start is valuation of the
current business plan. Traditional DCF
analysis for investment evaluation uses
both an estimate of the cash inflows
and outtlows within the investment
period and a discount rate to factor in
the uncertainties associated with time.
The riskier the cashflows the higher is
the discount rate. The methodology
for determining the discount rate is
provided by the CAP1vI, which
disaggregates overall risk into market or
diversifiable risk and firm or non-
diversifiable risk. It is based on
portfolio theory that proposes that
investors can diversify away market
wide risks bv constructing portfolios to
suite their risk profile while leaving
firm-specific risk to management.
But DCF alone based on a single
financial forecast has obvious
limitations, and can miss important
strategic considerations.
Add some sensitivities and
simulations
For this reason a number of extensions
to DCF valuation are employed to
address the complexities introduced bv
the assumption of active management
within the investment period. These
consist of sensitivity analysis, Monte
Carlo simulations and the use of
decision trees to map the contingencies
within the investment period.
In sensitivity analysis, a base 7\iPV
case is set and key variables are
identified. ,1, suitable range for each
variable is estimated and discrete values
from within the range are then fed into
the main :\PV model to generate a
table of values.
The drawbacks of this approach are
that interdependencies are missed and
the estimated range is subjective,
covering typically only best case, worst
case and expected case scenarios.
The procedure for a Monte Carlo
simulation is to set up mathematical
relationships that describe the
operation of the variables for the
particular investment being modelled.
Distributions for individual variables
are allocated and sample random values
are collected for each variable.
Outputs are then repeatedly obtained
using the random value set inputted
into the mathematical relationship
used for the model.
After a sufficiently large number of
iterations, a mean and variance are
obtained from the output set to obtain
a valuation.
The process is evidently more
sophisticated and inclusive than that
-------
for sensitivity analysis, is a significant
step forward from linear DCF, and in
addition provides valuable insights into
a range of possible value outcomes.
Now build in flexibility to make
decisions
Both scenario modelling and sensitivity
analysis suffer from some major
drawbacks. Important decisions
contingent on important events are
missed simply because the simulation
keeps on running, whereas in a real
scenario, management may elect to
stop the process or make major
alterations to the investment. This
dition is known as a free boundary.
Examples are a rare catastrophic event
or a major discovery in Research and
Development (R&D). Consequently the
role of important exogenous events
could be missed and not factored into
the investment's discount rate.
Contingencies can be imported into
:-JPVthrough the use of decision trees
as proposed by Hertz (1964). This
allows the availability of choices to be
mapped along the time series within
the investment period. The result is
that probabilities can be explicated and
used to weight respective outcomes to
provide a weighted distribution of
outcomes at the end of the tree. These
are then subsequently discounted back
to the present to provide a summary
ation. In this way decision trees
continue to constitute a variant of NPV.
There are other sophisticated
procedures which can be used to model
real options such as dynamic
programming, contingent claims
analysis and compound options,
however for simplicity they are not
discussed here.
CONCLUSION - IT'S WORTH
THE EFFORT
Leveraging off corporate strategy, real
options analysis provides a set of tools
which explicitly recognises that
flexibility is economically valuable,
largely because investments are
characterised by a degree of
uncertainty. While uncertainty can
only be resolved with time, tlexibility
provides management with the right
but not the obligation to choose from
a pre-established set of actions so as to
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limit downside risk and take advantage
of opportunities. This includes the
management options to defer, switch,
expand or abandon an investment or
business activity.
Embedded real options, whether
through design or through
circumstance, allow management to be
actively involved in the process of
capitalising on information feedback
that arises within any investment
period. The strength of this thinking is
its capacity to support the strategic
management of investments with a
descriptive framework, which for the
first time provides a quantified
roadrnap for changes in strategy.
Analytical models are somewhat
limited in practice, particularly where
complex investment problems have
many real options operating that
interact simultaneously or when
competitive entry occurs, leading to
crossover between projects. Work
continues on ways to model these
challenges. In the meantime, the
developments to date extend the
traditional DCF analysis and are already
providing management teams with a
better understanding of value, and a
clear advantage over their competitors.
Should the plant be upgraded now, or
should a competitor's strategy be
replicated? How much should be spent
on R&D this year, and next?
Management and the board could be
surprised by the answers.
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